The Conflict of Reason and Passions: The Moral Portrait of the Individual in the Philosophy of D. Hume

Ashurova, Khurshida, Ашурова, Хуршида, Ashurova, Xurshida

Жамият ва инновациялар / Общество и инновации / Society and innovations · 2026-yil

Annotatsiya

This article explores the problem of personality through the prism of David Hume’s moral philosophy and his views on human nature. Unlike traditional rationalist approaches associated with Descartes and Spinoza, D. Hume describes the human “I” not as a logical center but as a set of affects (passions) and habits. The article analyzes Hume’s famous thesis, “Reason is a slave to the passions,” and reveals the voluntaristic (volitional-emotional), rather than cognitive, foundations of personal identity. The results of the study show that the stability of the individual is manifested not in memory but in “character”—that is, in the mechanisms of stabilized passions and social sympathy.

Maqola ma’lumotlari
MualliflarAshurova, Khurshida, Ашурова, Хуршида, Ashurova, Xurshida
JurnalЖамият ва инновациялар / Общество и инновации / Society and innovations
Nashr sanasi2026-06-05
Jild7
Son3
Betlar434-438
TilO‘zbek
DOI10.47689/2181-1415-vol7-iss3-pp434-438

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