COMPETITION IN THE INFORMATION MARKET: MONOPOLY TRENDS AND THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ECONOMY

Mo‘ydinjonova , Durdonaxon, Ismanov , Ibrohim

Муҳандислик ва Иқтисодиёт · 2026-yil

Annotatsiya

This article examines whether Uzbekistan’s competition-policy architecture can adequately address concentrationin multi-sided digital markets. Employing the Rochet–Tirole two-sided platform model and Schmalensee’s analysisof single- and multi-homing, the study shows that conventional tools — the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, the standardLerner Index, and the SSNIP test — misstate market power when consumer-facing prices are zero. Using UNDP andMEF structural data and case evidence from Uzum Market, Yandex Go/Eats, and the Payme–Click–TBC Bank cluster, thepaper demonstrates that Uzbek platforms apply asymmetric, elasticity-proportional pricing consistent with the generalizedRochet–Tirole Lerner formula.

Maqola ma’lumotlari
MualliflarMo‘ydinjonova , Durdonaxon, Ismanov , Ibrohim
JurnalМуҳандислик ва Иқтисодиёт
Nashr sanasi2026-07-01
Jild4
Son7
Betlar169-173
TilIngliz

Kalit so‘zlar

two-sided markets; platform economics; Rochet–Tirole model; digital antitrust; Uzbekistan; competition policy; tipping markets.

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